Security: Difference between revisions

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This page explains how coreboot can help with various security aspects of your system, compared to closed-source, legacy BIOS/EFI/firmware implementations.
This page explains how coreboot can help with various security aspects of your system, compared to closed-source, legacy BIOS/EFI/firmware implementations.


== Introduction ==
<div style="color:red">This page is work in progress!</div>


== RAM wiping ==
== Common security features ==


== SMI issues ==
* Boot password (like BIOS password)
* Signature verification - option to boot from payload only signed images
[[Bayou]] / [[coreinfo]] / [[GRUB2]] have "BIOS password"-like feature, using SHA-1 hashes stored in NVRAM or the (flash) ROM chip.
GRUB2 can also do signature verification of on-disk operating systems. [[TianoCore]] could probably be adapted to support either, too.


== ATA issues ==
Both features are in the payload domain since coreboot doesn't provide a user interface.


== BIOS password feature ==
* RAM wiping after each boot
This is not very useful: The most interesting time would be right before power-off, which could be implemented in [[SMM]]. Unfortunately a cautious attacker just pulls the plug.


== Firewire issues ==
 
To prevent reading data after a reboot, a payload could be adapted to clean out memory. Using applications that manage sensible data sensibly (ie. wipe after use) is still a better solution.
 
* Support booting from encrypted block devices/volumes
GRUB2 can do that.
 
== Current BIOS issues ==
 
=== RAM wiping ===
 
* http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/
* [[Coreinfo]] as demo payload for coreboot, [http://www.coreboot.org/images/3/3d/Coreinfo_ramdump.jpg showing your RAM contents after a cold boot].
 
=== SMI issues ===
 
* http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/fr/sciences/fichiers/lti/cansecwest2006-duflot.pdf
* http://tracker.coreboot.org/trac/coreboot/ticket/42
 
=== ATA issues ===
 
* http://coreboot.org/pipermail/coreboot/2005-May/011686.html
* http://www.heise.de/ct/english/05/08/172/
 
=== Firewire issues ===
 
* http://md.hudora.de/presentations/firewire/
* http://www.hermann-uwe.de/blog/physical-memory-attacks-via-firewire-dma-part-1-overview-and-mitigation
 
=== TPM issues ===
 
* http://tracker.coreboot.org/trac/coreboot/ticket/49

Revision as of 15:26, 4 May 2014

This page explains how coreboot can help with various security aspects of your system, compared to closed-source, legacy BIOS/EFI/firmware implementations.

This page is work in progress!

Common security features

  • Boot password (like BIOS password)
  • Signature verification - option to boot from payload only signed images

Bayou / coreinfo / GRUB2 have "BIOS password"-like feature, using SHA-1 hashes stored in NVRAM or the (flash) ROM chip. GRUB2 can also do signature verification of on-disk operating systems. TianoCore could probably be adapted to support either, too.

Both features are in the payload domain since coreboot doesn't provide a user interface.

  • RAM wiping after each boot

This is not very useful: The most interesting time would be right before power-off, which could be implemented in SMM. Unfortunately a cautious attacker just pulls the plug.


To prevent reading data after a reboot, a payload could be adapted to clean out memory. Using applications that manage sensible data sensibly (ie. wipe after use) is still a better solution.

  • Support booting from encrypted block devices/volumes

GRUB2 can do that.

Current BIOS issues

RAM wiping

SMI issues

ATA issues

Firewire issues

TPM issues